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The Monitoring Committee and Outside Directors'
Evolving Duty of Care
ARTHUR W. HAHN*
CAROL B. MANZONI**
INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been an expanding view of the role the
outside director should play in corporate governance. Securities and
Exchange Commission Chairman Harold Williams has gone so far
as to call for boards of directors composed of outside directors, save
for a single management representative.' The corporate board room
has not changed to this extent, but there is a strong movement to
utilize outside directors as monitors of management conduct. This
movement has manifested itself, at many corporations, in the estab-
lishment of committees of the board, controlled by outside directors,
whose assigned task is to oversee specific management functions.
This article will explore the evolution of these monitoring commit-
tees and their impact on the exposure to liability of both the direc-
tors who serve on the committees and those who rely on the commit-
tee reports.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE MONITORING COMMITTEE
The Role of the Traditional Board of Directors
The traditional statutory and common law duty of a corporate
board of directors was to manage the affairs of the corporation.' This
duty was to be dispatched with care and loyalty.' The board of
directors itself was generally composed of senior officers of the cor-
poration and an occasional outsider placed on the board as an honor
or because he had a close working relationship with the manage-
ment of the corporation. Directors in this latter category included
the corporation's lawyers, accountants and bankers.
* Partner, Pope, Ballard, Shepard & Fowle, Chicago, Illinois. B.A. 1966, Miami Univer-
sity; J.D. 1969, Northwestern University.
** Associate, Pope, Ballard, Shepard & Fowle, Chicago, Illinois. B.A. 1969, Bucknell Uni-
versity; J.D. 1977, Catholic University.
1. SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 437 at A-22 (Jan. 25, 1978)(speech at Securities
Regulation Institute).
2. See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.33 (1975); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 1977 Pocket Part).
3. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1977 Pocket Part); Bowerman v.
Hamner, 250 U.S. 504, 511-13 (1917); Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152 (1891); Guth v.
Loft, Inc., 23 Del. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939).
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As the modern corporation became more complex, the board of
directors in many instances did not actually manage the corpora-
tion. Rather, it delegated that responsibility to officers and the pro-
fessionals who assisted those officers. The entire board of directors
continued to perform statutorily required formal functions such as
issuance of securities,4 declaration of dividends,5 election of officers,'
and significant disposition of assets.7 Often, the board did not, how-
ever, perform the analysis of the data necessary to make significant
business decisions, and thus did not really make the decisions them-
selves. Instead, key officers, often acting as the board's executive
committee, analyzed the data and made the important decisions.
Normally, major policy questions were presented to the entire
board, but these issues were generally accompanied by a minimal
amount of background information and a management recommen-
dation. The recommendation generally would be accepted virtually
pro forma by the entire board. If questions arose, they were referred
either to the officer with the most expertise in the area or to outside
professionals: lawyers, accountants, and bankers, who were chosen
by and were basically responsive to management.
Under this system, the non-management members of the board
of directors often did not have the necessary information with which
to intelligently oversee management. To the extent that they pos-
sessed the information, the data was filtered through management.
In this context, the non-management director, who was minimally
compensated, infrequently called upon, and often the personal
friend of the management group, could not and did not hold the
officers accountable for their actions. The role of the outside director
within this arrangement was aptly described by Lord Boothby as
follows:
No effort of any kind is called for . . . You go to a meeting once a
month in a car supplied by the company. You look both grave and
sage, and on two occasions say 'I agree,' say 'I don't think so' once,
and if all goes well, you get $1,440 a year. If you have five of them,
it is total heaven, like having a permanent hot bath.
4. See, e.g., DFL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(c) (1974).
5. Id.
6. Id. at § 142(b).
7. Id. at § 141(c).
8. Lord Boothby, quoted in H. HENN, CORPORATIONs 454 n.3 (2d ed. 1970), in the context
of a statement that directors may be liable for corporate losses resulting from passive, as well
as active, negligence.
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Traditional Shareholders' Actions at Common Law
When a shareholder sought to hold a director liable for his failure
to meet his statutory and common law duty to manage the corpora-
tion, including the oversight of management, he invariably lost.,
The courts never formally relieved directors of their traditional duty
to manage the corporation with care. Nevertheless, they recognized
the reality of the director's role and sanctioned his conduct as long
as it could be justified by the reasonable exercise of business judg-
ment,10 or by reliance on management," reports of outside experts,"
or committees of the board of directors. 3 Directors were said to have
no obligation to establish a system of corporate espionage." Even in
cases of apparent gross failure to monitor management, they were
relieved of liability because of the realization that success or failure
of the enterprise really rested on management, to whom the respon-
sibility was delegated. 5
In a typical case of this era, Martin v. Hardy," a trustee in bank-
ruptcy brought an action for negligence against the directors of a
company which had suffered substantial losses due to the misman-
agement by the major shareholder who ran the business. The court
relieved all the directors of liability, including one who had paid no
attention to the business whatsoever. The court found this director
to have been negligent, but it declined to hold him accountable
because even if he had tried to exercise some supervision, it would
not have had any impact, due to the delegation of responsibility to
management.
The Mounting Pressure to have Directors Monitor Management
In the 1960's and 70's the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) began to pressure companies to have their boards of directors
exercise a meaningful check on management conduct.'7 For exam-
9. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corpo-
rate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L. J. 1078, 1099 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Bishop].
10. See 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1039 (rev.
ed. 1975); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
11. Warner v. Penoyer, 91 F. 587 (2d Cir 1898); Lowell Hoit & Co. v. Detig, 320 Ill. App.
179, 50 N.E.2d 602 (1943); Ohlendorf v. Rathje, 230 Ill. App. 427 (1923). See MODEL BUSINESS
CORPORATION ACT § 35 (1977).
12. See Cory Mann George Corp. v. Old, 23 F.2d 803 (4th Cir. 1928). See also MODEL
BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 35 (1977).
13. See Allen v. Roydhouse, 232 F. 1010, 1015 (E.D. Pa. 1916); Ohlendorf v. Rathje, 230
Ill. App. 427 (1923); MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 35 (1977).
14. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. 78, 85, 188 A.2d 125, 130 (1963).
15. Martin v. Hardy, 251 Mich. 413, 232 N.W. 197 (1930).
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Speech by former SEC Commissioner, A.A. Sommer, Jr. to the Colorado
19781
Loyola University Law Journal
ple, the SEC report on the Stirling Homex Corporation Investiga-
tion"8 found that two prominent non-management directors of a
public corporation were systematically deceived by management as
to the true state of the company's affairs. After the company be-
came bankrupt, with substantial loss to the investing public, the
SEC analyzed the conduct of the non-management directors and
publicly declared that their monitoring function had been inade-
quately performed. Specifically, the SEC found that: (1) during the
years in question the board had as many as seven directors, but only
two of them were dissociated from management; (2) during the two
and a half years in question there were only seven board of directors'
meetings and several of these were conducted over the telephone;
(3) the board of directors' meetings consisted of announcements
made by management with littlediscussion or interrogation; (4) the
real decision-making body was the executive committee to which no
outside directors belonged; (5) no other directors' committees be-
sides the executive committee were established; (6) there were no
written agendas for the directors' meetings; (7) no information was
given to the outside directors on such subjects as backlog, aging
receivables, cash flow and competition; (8) no financial projections,
corporate development plans, or reports on the status of contracts
or agreements were provided; (9) the company's auditors were
changed without prior approval and with inadequate explanation;
and (10) the outside directors signed the registration statement for
the second public offering without independently checking with
auditors or counsel, and without being aware of the SEC's questions
Association of Corporate Counsel (February 1974) entitled "Directors And The Federal Secur-
ities Laws," in which he stated:
It is axiomatic to say these days that society is demanding constantly more from
those who occupy positions of trust . . . [fln corporate life, expectations are con-
stantly rising . . . . Increasingly the focus is upon those who, at least theoretically,
have the ultimate control over the vast corporate wealth of this country-the direc-
tors of publicly-held corporations . . . . In general I think it fair to say that histori-
cally directors have not been held to an excessively high, or even very high, stan-
dard of conduct .. . . State corporate laws do not appear to erect an unreasonably,
or again, even very high, standard for directors . . . .The tough questions concern-
ing the responsibilities and liabilities of directors have not in recent times arisen
under state statutes, but rather have their origins in federal securities law. The
impact of these federal cases has led to a renewed interest in the statutory delinea-
tion of directors' duties and responsibilities.
[19741 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1; see also SEC v. Penn Central, [1974] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 94,527 at 95,828 (E.D. Pa. 1974)(directors were sued because they "had reason
to know" of the wrongdoing of management).
18. Report of Investigation In The Matter of Stirling Homex Corporation Relating To
Activities Of The Board Of Stirling Homex Corporation, SEC Release No. 34-11516, [1975-
1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,219 (July 2, 1975).
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concerning the registration.'" By stressing the board of directors'
failure to perform the monitoring function, the SEC clearly gave
notice to the corporate community that personal liability could re-
sult from similar breaches of duty in the future.
In addition to the threat of SEC action, there was substantial
concern with the possibility of private plaintiffs holding directors
responsible under the securities laws for failure to monitor manage-
ment. There was a spate of private actions against directors and
officers who allegedly engaged in fraudulent sales of securities
within the meaning of rule 10b-5.2 In these actions several courts
of appeals, prior to the Supreme Court decision in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 1, concluded that something short of a knowing misstate-
ment or omission would be sufficient to establish liability. 22 The
concern thereby engendered in the corporate community was very
real, that the traditional director who failed to oversee management
and ,who consequently failed to discover material misstatements or
omissions in the sale of the corporation's securities, would be found
liable under rule 10b-5 for his negligence.
Writers labeled this surge of private and SEC actions against
directors "the age of corporate litigation,"" and they described at
length the personal and financial costs and risks to the director who
failed to monitor management." With the commencement of this
new era in securities litigation, the position of the outside director,
who continued to function in the traditional, inactive manner, be-
came untenable. The $1,440 which Lord Boothby described as so
attractive,'2 became inadequate compensation for the risk of an
SEC investigation or a shareholder's suit. The time seemed to have
arrived when, as Judge Learned Hand said, "No men of sense would
take the office if the law imposed upon them a guaranty of the
general success of their companies as a penalty for any negli-
gence." 2
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961); Royal Air Properties, Inc.
v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379-80 (10th Cir.
1965); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968);
City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 229-30 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905
(1970). See also SEC v. Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181, 185 (7th Cir. 1966).
21. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
22. See note 20 supra, for a sampling of typical cases from this era.
23. See, e.g., Caplin, Outside Directors and Their Responsibilities: A Program For The
Exercise Of Due Care, 1 J. CORP. L. 57 (1975).
24. Id.
25. See text accompanying note 8 supra, quoting Lord Boothby.
26. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
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The Committee System as a Response to the Need to Monitor
Management
By the 1970's, the corporate community began making significant
changes in the form of corporate governance. This was precipitated
both by a desire to respond to valid criticism about lack of manage-
ment accountability and also by a need to provide directors with a
practical way of fulfilling their monitoring duties in this age, of cor-
porate litigation. The traditional notion of corporate governance
through division of labor and delegation of responsibility was re-
tained as the only reasonable way to manage the modern corpora-
tion. In fact, the new Model Business Corporation Act specifically
contemplates that directors will place reasonable reliance on com-
mittees of the board of directors. 7 With the functional emphasis of
a director's duty focused on the monitoring of management, how-
ever, the inherent conflict in delegating to management the job of
overseeing their own affairs became apparent. Accordingly, while
the principle of delegation generally, and delegation to committees
of the board of directors specifically, was retained, the identity of
those doing the monitoring changed from primarily management to
committees of non-management or outside directors. 8
The exact definition of an outside director varies among corpora-
tions. The most prevalent view is that those who are labeled outside
directors for purposes of determining their eligibility to perform the
monitoring function should be unaffiliated with and generally inde-
pendent of the corporation.29 This would exclude those who have
material dealings with the corporation, such as the corporation's
lawyers and bankers.
In enforcement actions, the SEC has insisted that independent
directors control these "monitoring" committees.'" The New York
Stock Exchange rule on Audit Committees provides that such com-
mittees shall be "comprised solely of directors independent of man-
agement and free from any relationship that, in the opinion of its
Board of Directors, would interfere with the exercise of independent
judgment as a committee member." 3' Additionally, writers in this
27. MODEL BusiNss CoR'oAnoN ACT § 35 (1977).
28. See Corporate Director's Guidebook, 32 Bus. LAw. 5, 35-36 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Director's Guidebook].
29. Id. at 31-36.
30. See, e.g., SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,807 (D.D.C.
1974); SEC v. Lur's, Inc., [1974] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,504 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); SEC
v. Killearn Properties, Inc., [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,256
(N.D. Fla. 1977); Zale Corp., Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1977, at 9, col. 1.
31. 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 2,495H at 4229.
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area have almost uniformly concluded that only committees con-
trolled by independent directors can effectively perform the moni-
toring function. 31
The conclusion that only independent directors can perform the
oversight function carries with it the acknowledgement that suffi-
cient basic information must be made available to these monitoring
committees to allow them to hold management accountable in a
meaningful sense. 3This corollary, in turn, leads to the recognition
of three facts: (1) monitoring directors must be of the caliber neces-
sary to perform their new function; (2) they must devote considera-
ble time to the job; and (3) they must be adequately compensated
for their new efforts. 34 Finally, many commentators, including for-
mer Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, feel that these com-
mittees should be provided with their own staffs and access to inde-
pendent legal and accounting assistance.35
Thus, what has emerged in response to SEC and shareholders'
pressure to have meaningful management accountability is a func-
tional framework whereby the modern corporation can be managed
under the direction of the board of directors. 36 The key to this frame-
work is a system of committees made up of independent monitoring
directors.37
Form of the New Committees
The exact form of the committee system varies among corpora-
tions. It will be useful for the purposes of this article, however, to
describe briefly some of the more common variations and their gen-
eral functions.
The most common committee of the new mold is the audit com-
mittee. The New York Stock Exchange will be requiring audit com-
mittees for all corporations listed on the Exchange by June 30,
1978. 38 Its function as described in the Corporate Director's
Guidebook3l is:
1. To recommend the particular persons or firm to be employed
by the corporation as its independent auditors;
32. See, e.g., Director's Guidebook, supra note 28, at 31-36.
33. Id. at 22.
34. Id. at 32.
35. See Goldberg, Debate on Outside Directors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1972, § 3 (Business
and Finance) at 3, col. 2.
36. See MODEL BusINESS CORPORATION AcT § 35 (1977): "All corporate powers shall be
exercised by or under authority of, and the business and affairs of a corporation shall be
managed under the direction of, a board of directors .... "
37. See Director's Guidebook, supra note 28, at 35-36.
38. 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 2,495H at 4229.
39. Director's Guidebook, supra note 28.
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2. To consult with the persons so chosen to be the independent
auditors with regard to the plan of audit;
3. To review, in consultation with the independent auditors,
their report of audit, or proposed report of audit, and the accompa-
nying management letter, if any; and
4. To consult with the independent auditors (periodically, as
appropriate, out of the presence of management) with regard to the
adequacy of internal controls and, if need be, to consult also with
the internal auditors (since their product has a strong influence on
the quality and integrity of the resulting independent audit). 0
The SEC has also called for audit committees to review and report
to the full board on such matters as non-arms length dealings be-
tween the corporation, and its subsidiaries and those affiliated with
the corporation." In general, the SEC has sought to have the audit
committee serve as the quasi-public watchdog for corporate disclo-
sure.
4
Two other committees recommended by the Corporate Director's
Guidebook are nominating and compensation committees. 3 One of
the traditional elements of the inside director's power was the con-
trol of the corporate nominating mechanism. Under the
Guidebook's recommendation, however, the nominating committee,
which would be controlled by outside directors, would have respon-
sibility for nomination of new directors and the manner in which
management succession is effected. The nominating committee
would also have the responsibility for bringing recommendations to
the full board concerning membership of board committees and the
successor to the chief executive officer when a vacancy occurs. The
compensation committee would be charged with approving or rec-
ommending to the full board the salaries of senior management as
well as any stock option or other benefit program granted to officers
or directors.
Monitoring Directors' Evolving Duty of Care Under the Federal
Securities Laws and the Common Law
The remainder of this article will explore the evolving duty of care
under both the securities laws and the common law as it applies to
monitoring directors in the modern committee system of corporate
governance. In particular, the article will address the three sections
40. Id. at 36.
41. SEC v. Petrofunds, [1977] FED. SEc. L. RaP. (CCH) 96,098 at 91,947.
42. For cases which reflect this goal, see note 30 supra.
43. Director's Guidebook, supra note 28, at 35-36.
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of the federal securities laws" under which directors have tradition-
ally experienced the greatest danger of liability, and will focus on
the potentially heightened liability for monitoring directors under
the common law.
DIRECTORS' STANDARDS OF CARE FOR REGISTRATION STATEMENTS
Scope of Liability Under Section 11
It is axiomatic that the federal securities laws and the 1933 Act
in particular were designed to protect the investing public from the
chicanery of securities sellers by placing "the buyer on the same
plane so far as available information is concerned, with the seller." 5
This preeminent philosophy of disclosure finds its heart in section
5 of the 1933 Act," which provides that a registration statement
must be in effect before the security is sold.47 In addition to creating
the duty to disclose pertinent information, the 1933 Act establishes
in section 111s an express private right of action for persons who have
purchased securities for which a materially false prospectus in a
registration statement has been distributed."'
A basic understanding of the statutory provisions of section 11 is
particularly relevant when considering the potential impact the
monitoring committee may have on the liability of both directors
serving on the committee and directors relying on the committee.
Section 11's provisions are important because they create an elabo-
rate framework wherein liability attaches on the basis of an individ-
ual's functional role in the distribution of securities. Unlike other
provisions of the federal securities acts which speak in terms of
general liability, section 11 deliberately enumerates those persons
who will be liable if the information disclosed in a registration state-
ment is materially inaccurate or inadequate. Whether or not an
44. These sections are § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, §§ 10(b) and 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
45. 77 CONG. REc. 2918 (1933)(statement by Congressman Rayburn, House manager,
discussing drafting of Securities Act of 1933).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
47. The central regulatory provision of the 1933 Act is generally considered to be § 12, 15
U.S.C. § 77(l)(1976), which makes sellers liable to immediate purchasers for offering or selling
a security either in violation of § 5 or on the basis of untrue oral or written statements of
material facts.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
49. As Professor Folk has noted, § ll's private right of action provides the purchaser with
an extremely broad remedy inasmuch as privity between the purchaser and seller is not
required, the purchaser need not show that he relied on the misleading statement or omission
and liability will be imposed regardless of the defendant's intention. Folk, Civil Liabilities
Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Folk].
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individual is so named appears to be a function of that person's
potential ability to influence the content of the registration state-
ment as well as the extent to which a purchaser might rely on that
person's authority. 0
It is not surprising that the drafters of section 11 specifically
designated directors who are incumbent at the time of filing the
registration statement, prospective directors named in the state-
ment, and all those who have signed the statement,5 to bear the
burden of liability if those statements are false or misleading.52
However, the use of the monitoring committee injects yet another
entity into the distribution process. Therefore, a discussion of the
manner in which one must analyze a director's liability under sec-
tion 11 is necessary to determine what effect the monitoring com-
mittee may have on a functional analysis of that liability. Such a
discussion will also provide a useful analytical framework in which
to consider the liability that directors face under other sections of
the federal securities laws.
In spite of the precision with which section 11 singles out directors
for liability, a review of the section's legislative history indicates
that the drafters did not intend to hold directors strictly liable as
guarantors of the "absolute accuracy of every statement that they
50. See id. at 12. See also H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933); H.R. REP'. No.
152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1933).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976) states in pertinent part:
(a) In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became
effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that
at the time of such acquisitioh he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either
at law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue-
(2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar functions)
or partner in, the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the registration
statement with respect to which his liability is asserted;
(3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration statement
as being or about to become a director, person performing similar functions, or
partner; . . .
See, e.g., Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 365 F. Supp. 780, 791 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The
creation of an express private right of action in purchasers, as well as the specific designation
of directors for liability underscores the drafters' primary concern to create an atmosphere of
corporate accountability and to "do away with the ... dangerous and unreliable system of
depending upon dummy directors who have no responsibility." Folk, supra note 49, at 17,
quoting S. RaP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1933).
52. A director may also find himself liable as a seller under § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976),
whether or not a prospectus is delivered or required to be delivered. See, e.g., In re Caesars
Palace, 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). For a comprehensive discussion regarding the
potential liability a director faces under § 12(2) of the 1933 Act, as compared with that under
§ 11, see Folk, supra note 49, at 199-271.
Outside Directors' Duty of Care
are called upon to make. '53 Rather, as the Supreme Court noted in
Hochfelder, by providing those persons who have prepared registra-
tion statements with a "due diligence" defense, liability under sec-
tion 11 is essentially predicated on a standard of negligence. 54 How-
ever, prior to determining whether or not a director has exercised
the degree of care necessary to satisfy the due diligence defense, one
must first examine the type of information which is involved.
The Due Diligence Defense and the Type of Information Involved
Section 1l's defense of due diligence incorporates the common
sense realization that, in order to meet the demands of their posi-
tion, directors find it necessary to delegate many of their investiga-
tory duties.55 Accordingly, section 11 provides that certain portions
of a registration statement may be prepared by "experts." These
experts may be held liable if they have consented to being named
as having prepared or certified any part of the registration state-
ment, or if they have prepared or certified any report which is used
in connection with the registration statement." It is not surprising,
therefore, that in recognition of the expert's role, section 11 makes
a distinction between the "expertized" and the "non-expertized"
portions of a registration statement, and specifically creates two
different standards of care to be applied when a director raises the
defense of due diligence.
To avoid liability for the non-expertized parts of a registration
statement, a director must show that
he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to be-
lieve and did believe, at the time such part of the registration
statement became effective, that the statements therein were true
and that there was no omission to state a material fact required to
be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading .... 51
53. H.R. RaE. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933). Although it is apparent that directors
were never intended to be held strictly liable, the same is not true of issuers who are absolutely
liable under § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1976).
54. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200, 207-08 (1976). See also Burger v.
CPC Int'l, Inc., [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,157 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
55. See H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1933), stressing the reasonableness of
delegating responsibility where "the character of the acts involves professional skill or facili-
ties not possessed by the fiduciary himself."
56. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4)(1976). See, e.g., Grimm v. Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods, [Current
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,029 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)(independent accoun-
tant's liability under § 11 limited to those figures which he certifies).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (1976).
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This standard serves to prevent a director from relying on the repre-
sentations of others and places upon him a burden of undertaking
his own investigation to determine whether the registration state-
ment complies with the law.
A lesser degree of due diligence is required for expertized portions
where a director must show that
he had ...reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the
time such part of the registration statement became effective, that
the statements therein were true and that there was no omission
to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary
to make the statements therein not misleading ....5s
Thus, a director need not independently investigate the state-
ments of experts unless he has reason to believe they are inaccurate.
By defining "reasonable" in the context of both the expertized
and the non-expertized portions of a registration statement to be
"the standard of reasonableness . . . required of a prudent man in
the management of his own property,"59 section 11 implies that the
negligence standard derived from the due diligence defense is a
flexible one which will be affected not only by the type of informa-
tion involved but by the relationship of the director to that informa-
tion.' Indeed, the functional role of the director within the corpo-
rate structure is crucial to any discussion of liability under section
11.
The BarChris Case-A Functional Analysis of Liability
The fact that a director's liability under section 11 is affected by
the functional role which he plays within the corporate structure is
borne out by a review of Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.6
Although by no means recent, BarChris remains the leading case on
directors' liability under section 11. A brief discussion of the court's
holdings is therefore necessary to understand what effect, if any, the
use of committees may have on the standard of care demanded of
both inside and outside directors.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B) (1976).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1976).
60. This fundamental concept was confirmed by James M. Landis who participated in
the drafting of § 11 and stressed that it was the intent of the legislature to vary the duty of
care according to the involvement of the individual in the registration process. See Landis,
Liability of Securities Act Authoritatively Discussed, 18 AM. ACCOUNTANT. 330, 332 (1933).
61. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). BarChris involved a class action by buyers of
debentures issued by the defendant corporation. Defendants were the issuer, signers of the
registration statement, underwriters, and the corporation's auditor. The court found that the
prospectus did contain material misstatements and omissions. None of the defendants suc-
ceeded in establishing their due diligence defenses.
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In assessing the liability of numerous directors, the BarChris
court basically focused on two elements-the functional role of the
individual director and the type of information involved. As a result
of the court's analysis, those "inside" directors who were found to
be active members of the executive committee could not meet the
burden of due diligence with respect to either the expertized or the
non-expertized portions of the registration statement. This failure
was occasioned primarily because the court presumed that these
directors were naturally familiar with the workings of the corpora-
tion and therefore could not possibly have "reasonable ground to
believe" the truth of a registration statement containing a false
statement or omission.2
Thus, active inside directors may find that only the most vigorous
investigations into the content of a registration statement will ena-
ble them to sustain their burden of due diligence.Y The inherent
difficulty that such a director has in avoiding liability places him
in a position akin to that of the issuer of securities who serves vir-
tually as a guarantor of the accuracy of the registration statement.6 4
Nor is this presumption and concurrent liability at odds with the
belief of the drafters that the diligence required of a person under
section 11 should "var[y] in its demands upon participants in [a]
security . . . distribution and with the degree of protection that the
public has a right to expect. 6 5 It is clear that the investing public
is entitled to expect an extremely high degree of care from active
inside directors whose status and access to information create in
them a "moral responsibility to the public." 6
In marked contrast to the burden placed on active inside direc-
tors, BarChris established that outside directors not intimately as-
sociated with the preparation of a registration statement will not be
subjected to the same presumption of knowledge which an inside
director must bear.67 Consequently, outside directors may establish
their due diligence defense by conducting reasonable investigations
into non-expertized portions of a registration statement while at the
same time relying on the competence of experts for other portions.
62. Id. at 684-85. This same presumption was made earlier in Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d
718 (8th Cir. 1967).
63. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Alodex Corp., 409 F. Supp. 1201, 1203 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Feit
v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
64. See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 578 (E.D.N.Y.
1971). See also note 53 supra.
65. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933).
66. Id.
67. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 687-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
68. See Folk, supra note 49, at 26-32. See also Blakeley v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 255, 264-65
(D. Ore. 1972).
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Whether or not an investigation will be deemed reasonable, and the
extent to which reliance on experts will be permitted, also varies
from director to director. 9 BarChris does, however, make it clear
that in virtually all cases, outside directors must do more than
accept the oral assurances of inside directors.70
Impact of the Committee System on Directors' Section 11 Liability
It is reasonable to assume that at least one monitoring committee
of the board of a modern corporation will be charged with overseeing
a portion of management's work on registration statements. The
effect such a monitoring committee will have on the traditional
liability of outside directors under section 11 is as yet unclear. Nev-
ertheless, several theories appear worthy of discussion.
One might argue initially that the placement of an outside direc-
tor on a committee which has some responsibility for the oversight
of significant portions of a registration statement will enable the
director to gain access to corporate records. This access could in
turn permit him to better conduct "reasonable investigations" to
establish a due diligence defense.
However, the danger exists that by sitting on such a committee,
the outside director may suddenly find that, like the inside directors
in BarChris, because of his access to and involvement with corpo-
rate information, he is presumed to have detailed knowledge of the
company. This presumption may make it extremely difficult for
him to meet the burden of due diligence.71
Even more interesting is the notion that because monitoring com-
mittees are composed of persons who are independent of manage-
ment and are supposedly more responsive to the needs of the invest-
ing public, a director who sits on such a committee could be held
to a standard of care analogous to that imposed on underwriters.
Like directors, underwriters are specifically designated for liability
under section 1172 and are provided with the defense of due dili-
gence. However, BarChris established that, unlike inside directors
69. The decisions since BarChris have focused on the functional role of the director when
determining what is a reasonable investigation. Because of the paucity of cases and the
multitude of variables, it is impossible to perceive universal guidelines. Rather, as the court
noted in Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 577-78 (E.D.N.Y.
1971): "What constitutes reasonable investigation and a reasonable ground to believe will
vary with the degree of involvement of the individual, his expertise, and his access to the
pertinent information and data. What is reasonable for one director may not be reasonable
for another by virtue of their differing positions."
70. 283 F. Supp. at 687-89.
71. See note 20 supra and accompanying text for cases illustrative of this presumption.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(d)(1976).
73. Id.
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who may be faced with an automatic presumption of knowledge and
therefore may find it virtually impossible to meet the burden of due
diligence, an underwriter may meet the burden by undertaking an
independent verification of the contents of a registration state-
ment.74 The reason for the imposition of this particular duty of care
lies once again in a functional analysis of the underwriter's role.7"
The BarChris court recognized that in the scheme of securities
distribution, the underwriter stands in an "adverse" position to
company officers.76 Because the underwriter's community standing
and economic livelihood depend upon the integrity of its recommen-
dations, the underwriter must necessarily investigate thoroughly
the claims of prospective issuers.77 These factors combine to create
a feeling of public trust and reliance in the underwriter which in
turn demands that if underwriters are to satisfy the requirement of
due diligence they must always verify the statements of manage-
ment.
Similar reasoning may result in the same public trust and reliance
being placed upon the outside director sitting on a monitoring com-
mittee. Although directors traditionally have not been viewed as
standing in an "adverse" role to one another, the use of the commit-
tee system may foster this perception." The outside director who
does not owe his livelihood to the company but who now monitors
the preparation of the registration statement may well develop a
sense of "public" integrity akin to that demanded of the underwri-
ter. Although he does not labor under the same presumption of
knowledge as inside directors, he may find that, like the underwri-
ter, he must independently investigate each representation made by
management if he is to satisfy the requirements of due diligence and
avoid liability under section 11.
74. 283 F. Supp. at 693-97. See also Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F.
Supp. 544, 578 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) wherein the underwriters, but not the inside directors, met
the burden of due diligence.
75. The BarChris court made it quite clear that the underwriter was responsible for "the
truth of the prospectus." Id. at 697. Therefore it was necessary to independently verify the
data submitted by the company's officers and counsel although no such investigation was
necessary regarding "expertized" portions of a statement inasmuch as the underwriters had
no reason to believe there was a material misstatement or omission. Id. at 697-98.
76. Id. at 696.
77. Id. See also Folk, supra note 49, at 54-55.
78. A related theory has been advanced by SEC Chairman Williams who sees corporations
as being, in essence, quasi-public institutions and has stated that boards of directors should
be composed of disinterested outside directors whose "tension-producing forces" will create
the atmosphere of adversity necessary to achieve effective corporate governance. SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) No. 437 at A-23 (January 25, 1978). But see Leech & Mundheim, The
Outside Director of the Publicly Held Corporation, 31 Bus. LAw. 1799, 1811 (1976), cautioning
against the concept of the monitoring director as an adversary.
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Whereas the outside director who has assumed an active role in
the registration statement process may be held to a higher standard
of care, it is unlikely that inside directors no longer actively partici-
pating in the preparation of the statements will be held to the lesser
standard of care formerly reserved for unknowledgeable outside
directors. It is impractical to suggest that mere removal from the
registration process will relieve inside directors of the presumption
that they have a working knowledge of the company.
Applying section l's sliding scale of liability and functional role
approach, it is not illogical to assume that the use of monitoring
committees may have the effect of altering the standard of care
demanded of inside directors who are not on the committees. Be-
cause the new monitoring committees do not face the inherent con-
flicts of interest found in the traditional committee system, their
recommendations should receive particular credence. Accordingly,
inside directors who receive these recommendations should be per-
mitted to rely heavily on both the expertized and non-expertized
portions. This element of reliance may in turn make it possible for
inside directors to rebut their presumption of knowledge and to
establish a due diligence defense by reasonably investigating the
non-expert portions of the committee's report. 9 Of course, whether
an investigation is reasonable in any given situation will depend
upon the director's own knowledge and the type of information in-
volved. Likewise, outside directors who are not on the committee
and who are disinterested members of the board, should find them-
selves even farther removed from liability. These directors should
only be required to undertake their ordinary due diligence investiga-
tion, and a careful review of the monitoring committee report or
comments should be of assistance in fulfilling that obligation.
DIEcroRs' STANDARDS OF CARE FOR PROXY STATEMENTS
Scope of Liability Under Section 14
The Securities Exchange Act of 193480 expands upon the theme
of "protection through full disclosure" which dominates the Securi-
ties Act of 1933. Whereas the 1933 Act deals primarily with the
dissemination of material information in connection with public
offerings of securities, the 1934 Act focuses on preventing manipula-
tion of stock prices through regulation of securities exchange trans-
79. See Caplin, Outside Directors and Their Responsibilities: A Program for the Exercise
of Due Care, 1 J. CORP. L. 57, 80 (1975).
80. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1976).
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actions.8 ' To accomplish this goal, the 1934 Act imposes a series of
regular reporting requirements on companies whose stock is listed
on national securities exchanges.82 Those who violate these regula-
tions may be held liable under either express or implied private
rights of action. 3
In the past, directors have been particularly vulnerable under two
sections of the 1934 Act-section 14(a) 4 regarding proxy solicita7
tion, and section 10(b),11 the "catch-all" antifraud provision. Both
sections have enabling rules86 which speak in broad terms of liability
81. The 1934 Act also covers transactions on unregistered exchanges as well as over-the-
counter markets. 15 U.S.C. § 78b, e (1976).
82. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 14 (1934).
83. Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(i), (r), (t) (1976) with 15 U.S.C. § 78(j), (n) (1976).
84. Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976),
provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities
exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy
or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted
security) registered pursuant to section 781 of this title. (emphasis added)
85. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976),
provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
86. SEC rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1975) provides:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy
statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or
oral, containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circum-
stances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material
fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the
statements therein not false or misleading or necessary to correct any statement in
any earlier communication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same
meeting or subject matter which has become false or misleading.
SEC rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates as a
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but, unlike section 11 of the 1933 Act, directors are not held liable
merely because of their status. Although neither section expressly
creates a private right of action, the Supreme Court has recognized
that potential litigants have an implied right under each of the
provisions."
In discussing the scope of the judicially created private right of
action under section 14(a), the Supreme Court has emphasized that
the language of section 14(a) indicates that the drafters were con-
cerned primarily with protection of the individual shareholder
whose proxy is solicited."8 For this reason, the function and import-
ance of the proxy statement is recognized as analogous to that of the
registration statement, and the tone of section 14(a) is considered
to resemble section 11 of the 1933 Act more closely than it does
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 9
Moreover, the Court has tacitly recognized thatbecause directors
stand in a fiduciary relationship to existing shareholders, it is the
duty of those directors to insure that full and fair disclosure will be
made to stockholders so that they can make an informed and mean-
ingful choice among alternative courses of action. 0 In spite of the
imposition of this responsibility, lower courts have rejected the no-
tion that directors are guarantors of the accuracy of proxy materials
disseminated by a corporation.'
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
87. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (§
10(b)).
Earlier, in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964), the Supreme Court held that
the broad remedial purposes of § 14(a) made it necessary to imply a private cause of action
for violations of that provision and the rule promulgated thereunder. In so holding, the Court
recognized that "[the purpose of § 14(a) is to prevent management or others from obtaining
authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy
solicitation."
88. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), citing Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
89. See, e.g., Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 862, 863 n.12
(D. Del. 1972), aff'd, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976). Although it has been suggested that the
language of rule 14a-9(a) closely parallels that of rule 10b-5, a crucial distinction exists.
Whereas rule 10b-5 speaks in specific terms of fraudulent or manipulative activity connoting
an illicit motive on the part of the solicitor, no such language is present in either § 14(a) or
rule 14a-9(a). See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1298 (2d Cir. 1973); Globus
v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188, 197-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
90. See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964).
91. See, e.g., Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 859 (D. Del.
1972).
Because "any person" may violate § 14(a) by either "soliciting" or "permitting the use of
his name" to solicit a proxy, all directors should be especially leery of their potential liability.
Moreover, the fact that an outside director is not a part of "management" and therefore did
not actually participate in the proxy solicitation or affirmatively consent to having his name
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The courts have recognized, however, that because of the peculiar
position of trust which directors occupy vis-A-vis the corporation
and its shareholders, directors must be held to a higher standard of
care than proof of scienter would impose. With these considerations
in mind, the courts have generally agreed that both inside and out-
side directors should be held to a standard of negligence92 and have
permitted directors faced with an alleged violation of section 14(a)
to raise a defense frequently labeled "due diligence." 3 Liability has
been determined on a sliding scale akin to that employed in section
11 cases94 and, inherent in this scale, has been an analysis of the
functional role of the director.
Functional Approach to Liability
The functional approach to section 14(a) liability, particularly as
it applies to outside directors, was initially expressed by a federal
district court in Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co."5 and
was recently affirmed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. In
Gould, McLean Industries proposed to merge with R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Company. The merger agreement proposed that several of
McLean's largest shareholders would receive fifty dollars per share
for their stock while other shareholders would be given one share of
Reynolds preferred for each share of McLean's common stock. 7 Fol-
lowing the merger, numerous shareholders brought suit against both
the inside and outside directors alleging that they had participated
in a proxy solicitation containing a number of materially misleading
statements and omissions.9
used in connection with the solicitation will not protect him from liability where the board
of directors is authorized to act on behalf of management. See Gould v. American Hawaiian
Steamship Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 858 (D. Del. 1972). But see Yamamoto v. Amiya, [Current
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,263 (9th Cir. 1977) (presence of buyer's name
in allegedly misleading proxy statement insufficient to attach liability to buyer).
Nevertheless, the SEC has provided a mechanism whereby a dissenting director may disas-
sociate himself from the board of directors' recommendations and thereby avoid liability
under § 14(a). 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101(3)(a)(1) (1977). See also 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1), (2)
(1976), providing for a similar disassociation mechanism under § 11 of the 1933 Act.
92. See, e.g., In re Clinton Oil Co. Securities Litigation, 368 F. Supp. 813 (D. Kan. 1977);
Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777 (3d Cir. 1976), and cases cited
therein.
93. See, e.g., Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535 F.2d 761, 776-81 (3d Cir.
1976).
94. See text accompanying notes 61-70 supra, for a discussion of § 11 liability.
95. 351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972).
96. 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
97. Id. at 766.
98. Id. at 767-68. A discussion of what statements or omissions may be considered
material under § 14(a) is beyond the scope of this article. However, the Supreme Court has
recently attempted to define the test for determining that crucial element in TSC Indus. Inc.
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In determining the extent of the outside directors' liability, the
lower court in Gould adopted a negligence standard, the test of
which was whether a director "knew or should have known" that a
statement was "erroneous or misleading."" Realizing, however, that
the knowledge any particular director may have is a function of his
position within the corporation, the court articulated a "principle
of individualization":
[Tihe liability of any individual defendant is dependent upon his
due diligence or exercise of reasonable care, and therefore, the
negligence standard embodies a criterion which would permit con-
sideration of the individual's particular position with the corpora-
tion and his relationship to the pertinent information held to be
erroneously or incompletely stated in the proxy materials.',,
Applying this criterion, the Gould court held that a director must
read a proxy statement which the corporation is distributing if he
is to avoid being found negligent. 10' Moreover, it is clear that if a
director discovers information in a proxy statement which he knows
to be false or misleading, he is under an affirmative duty to take
steps to correct it. W2
In spite of the guidance which Gould provides, the parameters of
negligent conduct under section 14(a) have remained largely unde-
fined. Because of the close analogy drawn between section 14(a) of
the 1934 Act, and section 11 of the 1933 Act, the question arises
whether courts will look to the "due diligence" obligation imposed
on a director under section 11 in order to arrive at a precise defini-
tion of negligent conduct under section 14(a). Under section 11, in
order to avoid liability, a director must undertake a "reasonable
investigation" of the non-expertized portions of a registration state-
ment while only undertaking such an investigation of expertized
portions in unusual circumstances.'0 3 No such duty is statutorily
mandated under section 14(a), and it therefore remains unclear
whether or not directors have an affirmative duty to investigate the
content of a proxy statement.' 4 Although Gould suggests that no
v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), and the interested reader is advised to see Hewitt,
Developing Concepts of Materiality and Disclosure, 32 Bus. LAw. 887 (1977).
99. 351 F. Supp. at 866.
100. Id. at 865.
101. Id.
102. See rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1975), which specifically states that false or
misleading solicitation materials must be corrected.
103. See notes 57 & 58 supra and accompanying text, concerning § ll's duty to investi-
gate.
104. The fact that the defense of "reasonable investigation" is a 1933 Act concept and
therefore inapplicable to the duties imposed under various sections of the 1934 Act, has been
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duty is required',5 at least one court has held that an outside director
must, at a minimum, make a "reasonable investigation" into the
content of a proxy statement if he is to meet the "should have
known" test and avoid liability for negligence under section 14(a).'0
Impact of the Committee System on Directors' Liability Under
Section 14(a)
Just as placement on a monitoring committee may increase an
outside director's potential liability under section 11 by making him
an "active" director, placement on a committee which monitors the
preparation or distribution of a proxy statment may increase the
potential liability of an outside director under section 14(a), both
by increasing his involvement in the process and by providing him
with access to information he might otherwise not have. While this
change in status facilitates the making of a "reasonable investiga-
tion" which may be necessary to avoid liability under section 14(a),
it may also raise a presumption similar to that of section 11 that the
outside director "should have known" of any false or misleading
statement appearing in the proxy materials.' 7 Thus, the outside
director on the monitoring committee may find himself faced with
a heightened duty of care.
Another question is raised by the fact that while the Supreme
Court has not addressed directly the issue of which culpability stan-
dard is applicable to actions brought under section 14(a), its analy-
sis of the federal securities laws in the Hochfelder section 10(b) case
suggests that proof of scienter is unnecessary and that a negligence
raised by numerous commentators. Compare A Program by the Committee on Federal Regu-
lation of Securities, Current Issues and Developments in the Duties and Liabilities of Under-
writers and Securities Dealers, 33 Bus. LAW. 335, 372-73 (1977), with GOLDSCHMID, The Role
of the Outside Director in Assuring Adequate Disclosure, Fifth Annual Institute on Securities
Regulation, 121, 127-28 (1974).
105. Although the Gould court stated that the "burden of scrutiny" rested primarily on
directors, absent some "evident misstatement or irregularity," directors could rely on the
work of experts and were not required to "recalculate or reassemble financial or other re-
ports." 351 F. Supp. at 865.
106. Berman v. Thomson, 403 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Ill. 1970). Even more alarming than
the fact that an outside director may have to undertake his own independent investigation
into the contents of a proxy statement is the recent decision of Del Noce v. Delyar Corp.,
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,670 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), wherein the
court held that a director's subjective interpretation of whether or not a statement made in
a proxy solicitation was material would expose him to liability for negligence if a court found
that "the reasonably prudent shareholder would be misled by the words." Id. at 90, 303.
107. But see Mundheim & Leech, The Outside Director of the Public Corporation, re-
printed in PLI's DuiEs & RESPONSIILITIES OF OUTrsIDE DIRECTOaS at 187 (1977), wherein the
authors suggest that knowledge alone will not lead to an increase in liability for outside
directors unless it is coupled with a failure to take corrective measures akin to those already
specified in rule 14a-9. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
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standard will suffice. 08 However, in making its observations, the
Court cited the Second Circuit decision of Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc.,109 which specifically left undecided the issue of
whether scienter, rather than negligence, would be the appropriate
standard by which to judge "directors and other individuals having
some responsibility for such a [proxy] statement, as distinguished
from a controlling corporation which has been the beneficiary of the
action that was induced.""' 0
The failure of the Supreme Court to adopt a specific standard of
liability under section 14(a), combined with the Gerstle court's
suggestion that individuals who do not benefit directly from a false
or misleading statement should not be liable under section 14(a) for
mere negligence in the preparation of a proxy statement, creates
several interesting problems for the monitoring director. Indeed, the
Gerstle dichotomy between the individuals preparing the statement
and the corporation which solicits it becomes especially important
when viewed in the context of the committee system. Bearing these
factors in mind, it may be argued that outside directors on a com-
mittee which monitors proxy materials are so far removed from
management and have so little stake in the outcome of the solicita-
tion that they should only be liable for actions amounting to inten-
tional misconduct. Alternatively, inside directors with pecuniary
and proprietary interests should be held to a higher standard of
care.
On the other hand, if the standard of care which is demanded of
a director is based on an analysis of his functional role within the
corporate structure, it is reasonable to suggest that a very high
standard might be required of the monitoring directors. Precisely
because such a director is divorced from traditional management
conflicts of interest, shareholders may place special confidence in
him as the watchdog of shareholder welfare and may rely heavily on
the monitoring committee to assure the accuracy of proxy informa-
tion. This added reliance together with access to internal informa-
tion may well create a most stringent duty of care.
108. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 209 n. 27 (1976). See also TSC Indus.
Inc. v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 444 n.7. (1976), in which the Court specifically declined
to decide what standard of liability applies to § 14(a); see also note 89 supra.
109. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
110. Id. at 1298 n.16 (emphasis added).
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DIRECTORS' STANDARDS OF CARE IN CONNECTION WITH THE SALE OF
SECURITIES
Scope of Liability Under Rule 10b-5
In marked contrast to the negligence standards which are applied
in proxy and registration cases, it has been clear since the Supreme
Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder'" that proof of
scienter will be necessary for an action to lie under section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5,1 2 the general antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act. In
arriving at this decision, the Court focused on the wording of section
10(b), which it considered to be unlike either section 11 or section
14(a)." 3 Rather, the Court found that because section 10(b) is di-
rected toward "insiders," and specifically prohibits the use of "any
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security,""' it was clear that the drafters
intended liability to be determined under a stricter standard than
mere negligence would impose." 5
Although scienter was defined by the Court as a "mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud,""' a concept
which may be labeled "strict" scienter, the question of whether
recklessness may be considered a form of intentional conduct was
left open." 7 This has created confusion among lower courts which
have been left to define proof of scienter on their own."' In the
111. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). An in-depth decision of Hochfelder is beyond the scope of this
article. For a general discussion of the background of Hochfelder, see Recent Decision, Rule
lOb-5-Civil Liability Will Not Be Imposed In A Private Cause Of Action Under §10(b) of
the Act and Rule lOb-5 Absent An Allegation Of Scienter, 10 GA. L. REV. 856 (1976).
112. See notes 85 & 86 supra for the text of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Although Hochfelder
dealt specifically with the liability of accountants under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5, it is clear
that directors will be held to the same standard.
113. 425 U.S. at 207-09. See note 89 supra and accompanying text discussing the similar-
ity between §§ 14(a) and 11. In the wake of Hochfelder, a defendant could escape liability
under the § 10(b) scienter standard but, under the same facts, may still be found liable under
§ 14(a)'s negligence standard. See, e.g., Clinton Oil Co. Securities Litigation, 368 F. Supp.
813 (D. Kan. 1977). Whether actions under §§ 11 and 10(b) are mutually exclusive remains
unclear. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 752 n.15 (1975), suggest-
ing there may be no implied right of action under rule 10b-5 for conduct which is also
actionable under the express civil liability provisions of §§ 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act. While
it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the impact which Hochfelder may have on the
interrelationship of the various sections of the federal securities law, the interested reader
should see Cox, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder: A Critique and an Evaluation of its Impact upon
the Scheme of the Federal Securities Laws, 28 HAST. L.J. 569 (1977).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976) (emphasis added).
115. 425 U.S. at 197-206.
116. Id. at 193 n.12.
117. Id.
118. For an excellent discussion of the confusion which the Supreme Court's vague defini-
tion has caused among the courts see Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scien-
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absence of any significant guidelines, the courts have been deter-
mining liability much as they always have-on a case-by-case basis.
While some hold that a defendant must have an "intent to de-
fraud,"' 19 others require nothing more than the defendant's knowl-
edge of the material misstatement or omission to satisfy the scienter
requirement.'20 Still others have found common law reckless behav-
ior to be sufficient to support an action under section 10(b).121 How-
ever, regardless of how one defines scienter, it is apparent that, just
as liability for negligent conduct under sections 11 of the 1933 Act
and 14(a) of the 1934 Act is determined by resorting to an analysis
of the functional role of the individual in the exchange of securities,
proof of scienter must be established in a similar manner.
This type of functional analysis was made by the Second Circuit
which rejected the negligence standard in Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 22
and which, since Hochfelder, remains the leading case of outside
directors' liability under section 10(b). Applying a scienter standard
defined as "proof of a willful or reckless disregard for the truth,' 2
the Lanza court found that the defendant, an outside director of
BarChris, was not liable under section 10(b) for the material misre-
presentations and omissions made by the BarChris management to
the Victor Billiards Company during merger negotiations. To arrive
at this conclusion, the court focused on the fact that, although the
defendant had voted to approve the merger, he had not participated
in the negotiations and had no knowledge of the representations
ter under Rule lOb-5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REv. 213 (1977).
Prior to Hochfelder, the futility of defining a single standard of conduct to be applied to
all persons dealing with the issuance of a security was advanced and discussed in depth in
Mann, Rule iOb-5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of
Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1206 (1970).
119. See, e.g., Kaback v. Schweickart & Co., 415 F. Supp. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); United
States v. Charny, 537 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1976).
120. See, e.g., Herzfeld v. Laventhal Krekstein Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.
1976); Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719 (D. Okla. 1977); Equity
Funding Corp. [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,714 (C.D. Cal.
1976).
121. In Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977), the court
explained the rationale for including recklessness within the scope of rule 10b-5:
At common law reckless behavior was sufficient to support causes of action sound-
ing in fraud or deceit. Since there is no hint in Hochfelder that the Court intended
a radical departure from accepted Rule 10b-5 principles, it would be highly inappro-
priate to construe the Rule 10b-5 remedy to be more restrictive in substantive scope
than in common law analogs.
Id. at 1044.
122. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
123. Id. at 1305-06, citing Chris Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341,
363-64, 396-99 (2d Cir. 1973).
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which were being made to the purchasing company.'24 The court
acknowledged that, had the defendant participated in the
"dissemination of false information reasonably calculated to influ-
ence the investing public,"'' 5 he might well have been liable under
rule 10b-5.
It appears from Lanza that the less an outside director is involved
in the internal affairs of a corporation, the better able he will be to
withstand liability under a scienter standard.'26 This will certainly
be the case under a standard which demands actual knowledge or
participation before liability will be imposed.
Nevertheless, it is also clear after Lanza that use of the "willful
or reckless disregard" standard implies that a director has some
duty to maintain an awareness of significant corporate develop-
ments. Indeed, the majority in Lanza held that an outside director
has "an obligation to maintain an awareness of significant corporate
developments which may come to his attention." '27 However, the
court specifically denied that this duty of awareness was synony-
mous with the imposition of a duty on non-participating directors
to inquire as to what representations have been made to potential
purchasers of a company's stock and to ensure that all significant
adverse information has been conveyed to them.'28
The Committee System and Liability Under Rule l0b-5
If a strict scienter standard is applied to rule 10b-5 cases, the
124. Id. at 1281, 1289. The court concluded that in such circumstances "[a] director's
liability to prospective purchasers under Rule 10b-5 can thus only be secondary, such as that
of an aider and abettor, a conspirator, or a substantial participant in fraud perpetrated by
others." Id. at 1289.
It is beyond the scope of this article to deal with the concept of secondary liability advanced
in Lanza. However, for an informative analysis of this problem in the wake of Hochfelder,
see Rule 10b-5: Liability for Aiding and Abetting After Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 38 FLA.
L. REv. 999 (1978).
125. 479 F.2d at 1302.
126. See, e.g., Robinson v. Heilman, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,233 at 92,600 (9th Cir. 1977), wherein the Ninth Circuit indicated that proof of scienter
rather than negligence is the applicable standard for determining the liability for all partici-
pants in a securities transaction. However, the court noted than an individual's relationship
to the corporation and involvement in the transaction will alter the burden of proof.
127. 479 F.2d at 1306.
128. Id. at 1293-99. In this regard the court undertook a lengthy analysis of the language
and legislative histories of the securities acts. The court contrasted what it considered to be
the statutory duty imposed on directors under § 11 of the 1933 Act, i.e., to "reasonably
investigate" the contents of a registration statement, with the broad prohibitions of § 10(b)
of the 1934 Act. It concluded that requiring directors under § 10(b) to investigate statements
by management and to convey adverse information to potential purchasers would create a
duty stricter than that imposed by § 11. Imposition of such a duty would frustrate the purpose
of the 1934 Securities Act, which was to provide protection for the public "with the least
possible interference with honest business." Id. at 1309.
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existence of a monitoring committee should have little impact on
directors' liability. Only those with demonstrable intent to defraud
would be subject to liability. However, the committee system may
have a significant impact on potential liability for directors if the
applicable scienter standard includes willful or reckless disregard of
the truth. Although the court in Lanza specifically denied that a
non-participating director had any duty of inquiry, a director's
heightened involvement in the corporation by means of his presence
on a monitoring committee may increase his chances of being found
reckless and liable under rule 10b-5 if he fails to inquire into the
basis for management's statements. The extent to which this duty
of inquiry includes making an independent investigation remains
unclear, but it is reasonable to assume that even when applying the
willful and reckless scienter standard, a monitoring director should
only have to undertake an investigation when he has been put on
notice that the management statement contains a materially false
statement or omission.'29
Additionally, the committee system may increase the exposure of
certain directors in the area of reckless failure to disclose material
information. This is particularly true in light of the SEC's recent
Report of Investigation in the Matter of National Telephone Co.,
Inc. Relating to Activities of the Outside Directors of National Tele-
phone Co., Inc. '3 wherein the Commission criticized certain outside
directors for allowing management to continue to make optimistic
public statements when the company was in financial difficulty.
Part of the remedy suggested by the SEC was the delegation of the
responsibility for monitoring disclosure matters to an audit commit-
tee.
Traditionally, the decisions as to what and when information
should be disclosed to the investing public were made by manage-
ment. However, the SEC is now suggesting in the National
Telephone report that monitoring committee directors should also
assume some responsibility in the area of public disclosure. 3' Cer-
129. Compare Leech & Mundheim, The Outside Director of the Publicly Held
Corporation, 31 Bus. LAw. 1799, 1814-23 (1976), with Lanza v. Drexel, 479 F.2d 1277, 1307-
09 (2d Cir. 1973). Cf. Steinberg v. Carey, 439 F. Supp. 1233 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (outside trustees
did not act recklessly by relying upon management and counsel for the accuracy of the
prospectus).
130. See Exchange Act Release No. 14380, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 81,410 (January 16, 1978).
131. Although the National Telephone Report made it clear that outside directors have
some duty to correct publicly-disseminated materially misleading statements or omissions,
the manner in which this is to be done was not discussed. In this regard, it has been suggested
that in order to avoid liability under § 10(b) a director must, at the very least, resign his
position and may have an obligation to inform the SEC. See Wall St. J., Jan. 18, 1978, at 9.
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tainly concomitant with the assumption of this duty would be
heightened exposure under rule 10b-5 in SEC injunctive actions' 2
and possibly exposure to private actions under a standard of reck-
less disregard of the truth.
THE COMMON LAW DUTY OF CARE AND THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM
The Supreme Court has responded to the rash of private actions
under the securities laws by limiting plaintiffs' standing to sue and
by refusing to grant relief except in situations clearly contemplated
by Congress.13 At the same time, however, the Court has suggested
in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green13 that aggrieved shareholders
can seek relief elsewhere:
Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant
to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that
deals with transactions in securities, particularly where estab-
lished state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden.
As the Court stated in Cort v. Ash, supra, "Corporations are crea-
tures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate
directors on the understanding that, except where federal law
expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect
to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the
corporation." 35
Thus, the Supreme Court suggested that the continuation of the
battle to have directors hold management accountable for its ac-
132. Although the Supreme Court did not address the issue in Hochfelder, at least two
courts have held that scienter rather than negligence will be the appropriate standard for SEC
injunctive actions under § 10(b) and rule lob-5. See, e.g., SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, 420 F.
Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v. Cenco, Inc., [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,133 (N.D. Ill. 1977). See also Lowenfels, Scienter or Negligence Required
for SEC Injunctions Under Section lOb and Rule lOb-5: A Fascinating Paradox, 33 Bus. LAW.
789 (1978).
133. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977) (no implied private right of
action under anti-fraud provisions of the Williams Act); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438 (1976) (rule 14a-9 action; material fact defined as one involving substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder, knowing fact, would vote differently); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (proof of scienter required for rule 10b-5 violation);
Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232 (1976) (no § 16(b) liability when
defendant not 10% owner before the purchase and sale alleged to constitute violation); Ron-
deau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975) (no violation of § 13(d)(1) when failure to
disclose made in good faith and without injury to plaintiff); United Housing Foundation, Inc.
v. Fotman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (stock of cooperative housing project not security within
meaning of securities law); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)
(non-purchasers or sellers of security in question have no cause of action under rule 10b-5);
Securities Investors Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975) (no implied private right
of action under Securities Investor Protection Act); Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973) (no § 16(b) liability when defendant had no access to
inside information and no potential for speculative abuse).
134. 97 S. Ct. 1292 (1977).
135. Id. at 1303-04.
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tions must be shifted from the federal to the state courts.
The New York court in Diamond v. Oreamuno36 accepted that
burden over a decade ago. In that case the court allowed corporate
recovery in an insider trading case, the traditional province of the
federal courts under rule 10b-5. The Diamond court perceived noth-
ing in the federal law to indicate that it was intended to limit the
state's power "to fashion additional remedies to effectuate similar
purposes . .,. . The primary source of the law in this area ever
remains that of the state which created the corporation.' 137
More recently, the Delaware Supreme Court in Singer v. Magna-
vox Co. "3 found that a cause of action had been stated against
directors and officers of a company which merged in formal accord-
ance with the Delaware statute but were nevertheless alleged to
have breached their fiduciary duties because the merger was de-
signed solely to eliminate the minority interest. This result certainly
follows the course suggested by the Supreme Court in Green 31 in
that it decides basic corporate fairness issues under the common
law, rather than under rule 10b-5.
For the most part, however, private litigants seeking to hold direc-
tors liable for failure to monitor management will find almost no
helpful common law precedent. As one commentator observed:
"The search for cases in which directors of industrial corporations
have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncompli-
cated by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles
in a very large haystack."'' 0
Statutory foundation for breach of the duty of care is certainly
present in state law. State statutes typically hold directors account-
able for exercising "that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position would use under similar circumstances."'
These statutes have rarely been successfully invoked because
state courts have been reluctant to hold that the traditional outside
director, having delegated his responsibilities to management and
possessing limited factual information about corporate affairs, is
breaching his duty of care when he does not oversee management.
Although courts have excused such directors' failure to supervise
under the business judgment rule or in reliance on some form of the
136. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910 (1969).
137. Id. at 503-04, 248 N.E.2d at 915.
138. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1977).
139. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 97 S. Ct. 1292, 1303-04 (1977).
140. See Bishop supra note 9, at 1099-1100. Professor Bishop found only four such cases
and concluded that "none of these cases carries real conviction." Id.
141. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1977 Pocket Part).
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delegation doctrine,' the usual factual basis for such decisions has
been evidence that the directors were not expected to actually moni-
tor management and did not have the resources to perform this
function.
The question remains as to the possible result of a shareholder's
state court action against directors who had been participants in the
modern committee system. The reasonable expectation is that the
state courts will continue to apply the basic tenets of corporate law,
including the like-position standard of the duty of care, the reason-
able delegation principle, and the business judgment rule. When
these principles are applied to directors operating under the modern
committee system, the results may differ somewhat from the tradi-
tional conclusion of no liability for directors who fail to oversee
management.
For example, the modern outside director who serves on an audit
committee and has reasonable access to extensive information and
sophisticated independent professional assistance and who never-
theless fails to monitor management, may well be found to have
breached his common law duty of care. Courts could find that ordi-
narily prudent persons in that position, by today's corporate stan-
dards, would perform a meaningful oversight function. The business
judgment rule in this context may provide only limited protection
for the director who fails to become sufficiently knowledgeable
about company affairs to make the necessary business decisions.
Such directors will no longer be able to argue that a gross failure to
exercise judgment should be attributed to the management to whom
the job had been delegated.
Those directors who do not serve on the particular committees to
which the oversight function was assigned will probably be able to
escape liability under the reasonable reliance doctrine. The doctrine
of "reasonable reliance," however, is probably more strictly con-
strued today than it was traditionally. The non-committee member
will probably have to show that the committee itself was chosen
with care and that its reports were carefully read and reviewed. If
this review discloses mistakes, the non-committee director's duty of
care will require him, at a minimum, to bring those points to the
attention of the full board.
CONCLUSION
Directors will be carrying out their jobs against an unsettled legal
background in their new role as members of monitoring committees.
142. See notes 10-15 supra.
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Much of the case law, certainly in the common law decisions, was
developed with an implicit assumption that outside directors were
not expected to and did not have a significant role in corporate
governance. Given the emergence of the monitoring director, this
assumption will have to change as the courts respond to the more
responsible role of the outside director. Future cases may not an-
nounce radical new standards of care for directors, but as the use of
the committee system grows, monitoring directors may find them-
selves facing new applications of existing corporate and securities
law principles based on a functional analysis of the director's devel-
oping role in an era of corporate accountability.
